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ABSTRACT 
\Ve set out to demonstrate that one could earn a higher return by investing in Latin 
American bank deposits as opposed to us (eurodollar) bank deposits during 1980-1999. 
This turned out not to be the case in almost all instances~ and we lise this artide to 
explain why. The reasons were not the higher transactions costs in Latin America. Rather, 
governments tightly controlled (repressed) the financial markets in the 19805, such that 
the lower returns produced capital flight rather than a normal open-market outcome of 
higher return to offset higher risk. When the markets were opened up to more 
competition and freer capital flows in the 1990s, the resulting returns did rise above those 
in eurodollars, but not enough to compensate the lower returns of the 19805. \Y/e assert 
that in the 20005, returns in Latin America will move to a more traditionall'isk/return 
profile, but if the 19905 are any indication, they still may be a poor choice for dollar-
based investors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nominal, local-currency rates of return on similar bank deposits in Latin America 
have consistently remained above those in the United States, during periods of economic 
boom, recession aoci transitions between the two. These differences can be attributed 
partly to higher perceived risk in the Latin American countries (viz., higher real interest 
rates), but they may also be due to additional factors such as continuous deviations from 
purchasing power parity. And even more striking - they may not imply truly higher 
returns in Latin America at all, once currency devaluation is taken into account. 
This paper analyzes the interest differentials in US dollar terms between United 
States bank deposits and bank deposits in several Latin American cOllntrietl during the 
time period 1982-99. This period encompasses the debt crisis of the 1980s, generally 
agreed to have begun in 1982, and the economic boom of the 19908, beginning at 
different times for different countries between 1989 and 1992. Surprisingly, the general 
finding is that Latin American countries did not demonstrate higher returns in US dollar 
terms than the returns on similar financial instruments in the United States, but there are 
many differences between countries and time periods. The goal of this paper is to 
contribute toward explaining these phenomena. 
It is reasonable to think that investments that have a history of higher volatility will I 
consequently also have a hist01Y of higher average returns than the investment used as 
the base of comparison. What is surprising about the Latin American situation is the wide 
divergences in returns across countries and also the way that the 'risk premium' changes 
over time from high to low and also differs across countries. There appears to be n10re 
going on than simple adjustment of returns to reflect changes in risk. 
II. CONCEPTIJAL BASE 
The u ncledying empirical reality of Latin American returns is that they are much 
more volatile than returns in the United States; so one would expect a concomitant 
higher average return in Latin America, However, as shown below, the average returns 
for Latin American deposits during the past 20 years frequently did not exceed those in 
the United Swtes, even with the higher volatility. The "normal" pattern of higher risk 
being compensated by higher return did not occur in this context (cf. Smith and Walter, 
1997). Given this reality, our task is to try to explain this unusual risk/return relationship, 
over time and across countries. 
As a basis of comparison, returns will be discussed consistently in dollar terms, That 
is, rates of return in Latin American countries will be discussed in terms of their 
exchange-rate-adjusted values, in dollar rather than local currency terms. In the analysis 
ex post values will be used, that is, local currency interest rates adjusted for realized 
exchange rate changes over the relevant period. I Restating the main point: it was 
anticipated that Latin American bank deposit interest rates, adjusted into dollar terms 
using realized exchange rates, should have been persistently higher than similar bank 
deposit rates in the United States during 1982-99. This situation suggests ollr first 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #1: Lal'ill American illtemst ..ates, in dollar terms, have beell higher 
tball comparable US ,oates d",oing 1982-99. 
Over time, it is expected that during periods of greater macroeconomic stability in 
latin America, the volatility of returns should be lower, and the risk premium demanded 
~y investors should be lower than otherwise, Thus, during the more-stable 1990s up to 
1997 at least, retllrns may be expected to be closer to those in the United States, and the 
variance of these returns should be lower than during the more turbulent 1980s. Even 
this generalization must be taken with caution, since the 'Tequila effect' of Mexico's 
Financial crisis at the end of 1994 caused rates and returns to gyrate wildly for almost a 
year in a few countries of the region. The 1997-98 Asian fimlncial crisis, and certainly 
Brazil's financial crisis in early 1999, also may affect the Latin American rV.;k/return 
characteristics during this period. Based on the differences between the two decades, we 
suggest hypothesis 2. 
Hypotheses #2a and b: Latill Alllericall inte,'cst rates, i,. dol/ar terllls, have been 
closer to US rates ill the 1990s, and Lal'/Il AmeJ-ican rate volatility has declined 
relative to the 1980s. 
Across countries, it is expected that the less macroeconomically stable countries 
(e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Pe111, each of which experienced annualized inflation of over 
1000% at some time during the period) would have reqUired higher rates of return than 
their more stable neighbors. Likewise, when the same country was more stable 
macroeconomically, it should have demonstrated a lower risk premium (lower excess 
return over the US return) and also a lower variability of returns. Relative risk across 
countries suggests the next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #3: More ,"sky Latin Ame,-;can countries will have highe,' realized 
ret",."s tban less risky countries dm-jng 1982-99. 
Beyond the simple mean/variance aspects of Latin American investments, we may 
also expect an impact of international portfolio diversification on the required returns 
(Grubel, 1968). That is, we should expect that, ir the correlations between the Latin 
American returns and US returns are low 01' negative, then the returns reqUired by 
international Cclollar based) investors should be lower than if the correlations are positive 
and higher, If investors can reduce their overall portfolio risk by diversifying into Latin 
American investments, then they will demand a correspondingly lower return on the Latin 
American investments, In most of the literature this issue has been examined in the 
context of stock market investments, rather than bank deposits, but analogous logic holds 
here. l The problems of currency convertibility and transactions costs are especially crucial 
here, so the analysis is more limited in this area. Our expectation is that: 
Hypothesis #4: Investors Can reduce overall jJortfolio risk, or raise ,·etz,r,. for a 
given risk, by diversijj,jng i"to Latin AmeJ'icaJl bank deposit i"st,."ments. 
Another issue that can be considered using the bank deposit mte information is the 
,sitnilarity or dissimilarity of Latin American returns compareci to European or Asian ones, 
In looking at the rate of return in dollars versus Deutsche marks or yen, analysts have 
lOll nd that the differences in nominal interest rates can be partly attributed to real interest 
differences between countries and partly to deviations from purchaSing power parity. In 
the case of industrial-country currencies, most of the difference in returns comes from 
deviations from purchasing power parity, Given the lower level of macroeconomic 
development in Latin America, we may expect to find more of the difference in returns 
attributable to real interest differences, that is, to a continuing risk premium - but 
deviations from PPP also need to be explored, This issue suggests our final hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #5: Latitl Americatl batik deposit returtls demotlstrate a g,'eater 
COlllpOllellt of real illte,'est dlfferetlces with respect to the US returlls, as opposed 
to deviatiotls frolll purchasillg power parity. 
ill. THE FACTS 
Rates of return in Latin American countries have certainly been volatile in comparison 
with us returns on similar financial instruments. For example, using the most similar 
investment - a 3-month eurodollar bank deposiP - the average 3-111onth return in United 
States dollars for 1982-99 was 1.74 percent, with a standard deviation of 0.63 percent. In 
contrast the average (quarterly) return on a 3-month interbank deposit in Argentina was 
the US return minus 1.13 percent, with a standard deviation of 27.89 percent; and the 
a verage return on a similar deposit in Mexico was US minus 1.9B percent, with a standard 
deviation of 10.25 percent. In each instance the Latin American volatility, measured as the 
standard deviation of the returns, is far higher than the US volatility. 
Since one might expect different results under greatly different institutional and 
global economic conditions (Bekaert et aI., 1998), the total time period was subdivided 
into the early period that covered the Latin American debt crisis, from 1982 until 
whatever year the countly demonstrated stabilized, positive economic growth.-j This was 
between 1989 and 1994, depending on the eounny. Clearly, the results demonstrate that 
greater economic stability in recent years has coincided with improved returns for all of 
the Latin American countries studied (except for Brazil, which had a slightly higher return 
in the earlier period). 
Table 1 shows the rates of return for the Latin American countries and the United 
States, using the US rate as the base and presenting average excess returns for the Latin 
American countries. 
i'Journal ofErnerging Markets 
TABLE 1: 
RATES OF EXCESS RETURN ON 3-MoNTH BANK DEPOSITS* 
:;ountry Period 1 Period 2 Total Period 
................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
~rgentina Dec81-May91 June91-Dec99 Dec81-Dec99 
-0.0328 0.0129 -0.0113 
(0.3824) (0.0120) (0.2789) 
3razil Dec82-Nov94 Dec94-Dec99 Dec82-Dec99 
0.0302 0.0201 0.0273 
(0.1924) (0.1023) (0.1710) 
Chile Dec81-Feb90 Mar90-Decg9 Dec81-Decg9 
-0.0189 0.0113 -0.0026 
(0.0778) (0.0344) (0.0603) 
Colombia Mar86-Feb90 Mar90-Dec99 Mar86-Dec99 
-0.0079 0.0080 0.0034 
(0.0087) (0.1065) (0.0899) 
Mexico Dec81-Feb89 Mar89-Dec99 Dec81-Dec99 
-0.0512 0.0015 -0.0198 
(0.1278) (0.0742) (0.1025) 
Peru Mar88-May92 Jun92-Dec99 Mar88-Dec99 
-0.0869 0.0030 -0.0298 
(0.3537) (0.0365) (0.2185) 
Venezuela Mar84-Feb90 Mar90-Dec99 Mar84-Dec99 
-0.0418 -0.0086 -0.0213 
(0.1586) (0.1078) (0.1302) 
--.............. _-_ .. ---_ .. _--- .. --_ ........ _----.... _---------_ .... _ .... ---.. _ .. _-----------_ .. _ .. --------------_ .. ---------_ .. -.... --
United States Dec81-Feb90 Mar90-Dec99 Dec81-Dec99 
(simple quarterly 0.0223 0.0132 0.0174 
returns) (0.00532) (0.0031g) (0.00625) 
, 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
(Numbers in parenthe~es below the average returns are standard deviations.) 
• These rates are calculated as quarterly average rates for the time period shown, Latin 
merican rate converted to dollars minus the US (eurodollar) rate. 
ime periods are divided into the earlier, debt-crisis period of instability versus 1990s period ( 
stabilization. Most countries stabilized by the end of 1989. Exceptions were: Argentina, Brazil 
and Peru. 
Source: Calculated by the authors from IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
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Notice that for all of the countries except Brazil, the average excess returns over the 
US 3-month bank deposit rate were negative during the debt-crisis period of 1982-99. The 
great volatility in these markets was not offset by higher returns in dollar terms, During 
the 1990s in the era of economic opening throughout Latin America, excess returns have 
been positive in all cases except Venezuela, where the difference from US returns was 
less than one percent. The average excess returns for all countries for the entire 1982-99 
period are about negative 1-2 percent, with the exceptions of Brazil (+2.7%) and 
Colombia (+0.3%). 
In sum, we observe much worse dollar returns in Latin American bank deposits 
versus eurodoll"" deposits during the volatile 1980s, and typically slightly higher Latin 
American returns during the more stable 19905, Overall, there did not seem to be a "free 
lunch" for investors who could move funds to those banking markets, despite the often 
incredibly high local-currency deposit interest rates. 5 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Average excess returns for the seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) were calculated as: 
nominal Latin 
avo excess return = American return 
on 3-month CD 
/ currency devaluation 
/ over the period 
/ 
nominal US 
return on 
3-month CD 
Three-month periods were lIsed, so that the dnta began with the periociJanlHuy-
March, 1982, then moved to Febmaly-April, 1982, etc., through October-December, 1999. 
The analysis used ex post data, so that the end-oF-period exchange rate was the actual 
observed rate, rather than a forward or predicted rate at the beginning of the period 
when the investment decision would have been taken. 
v. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Each of the five hypotheses was tested using the data described above, and the 
results are discussed here. 
Hypothesis #1: Latill AlIle"icall imerest rates have beell higher tha .. comparahle 
US rates durillg 1982-99. 
This hypothesis appeared unlikely to be supported, based on obsemltion of Table 
1. The majority of the Latin American countries, except Brazil and Colombia, had lower 
average returns during 1982-99 than the United States. Using a simple t-test for the 
difference between means, we find that the returns were significantly lower for Mexico, 
Peru and Venezuela and signi!1cantly higher for Brazil. All of these results can be seen in 
Table 2 column I. 
£ 
TABLE 2: 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
Note: Actual Excess Returns are used to test H2a & H2b 
Country Hypothesis #1 Hypothesis #2a Hypothesis #2b 
(t-test) (t-test) (F-test) 
~M_~MM_W~ ___ 
.-------------------- ----------------------- -----------------------
Argentina -0.60 -1.20 42.77'** 
Brazil 2.27" 0.38 6.25*** 
Chile -0.63 -3.78*** 3.81*** 
Colombia 0.479 -1.03 6.60*** 
Mexico -2.83*** -3.81*** 18.85*"'* 
Peru -1.61' -2.38"'*'" 86.11*** 
Venezuela -2.24" -1.71" 2.86*** 
-------------------- ---------------------
--------------------.--------------
United States average return: 1.85 percent I 3 months 
standard deviation: 0.79 percent I 3 months 
Hypothesis #1: Latin American XR-adjusted nominal rates are higher than US rate, 
1982-99. 
Hypothesis #2a: Early period excess returns are higher than later period excess 
returns. 
Hypothesis #2b: Early period standard deviations of excess returns are higher than later 
period standard deviations of excess returns. 
This outcome is quite surprising, if we assume that the context in which the returns L1 
were occurring was in some sense "homogeneous." It appears that, despite the open-
market expectation that risk and return should compensate each other, in riskier Latin 
American countries the bank deposit returns were lower than in the us (or more 
precisely, in eurodoliars). Next we need to consider the risk 1110re explicitly. 
Hy}Jotbeses #2a tIIu/ b: Latin American Interest rates bave beell close,' to US rates 
ttl tbe 1990s, alld Latill Allle,-leatl rate volatility bas declined relative to tbe 1980 •. 
This pair of hypotheses can be tested in several ways. Firsl consider the second 
part, comparing interest rate volatility between the earlier debt crisis and the later 
economic opening periods. In this comparison using [<-tests for differences between 
variances, all countries except Colombia showed a significant reduction in rate volatility 
during the 1990s (see Table 2). In the case of Colombia there was a significant increase 
in rate volatility during the later period. In most instances the interest rates, converted 
into dollar terms, became much more stable during the non-crisis period. This is 
interesting because the open-market period did include such crises as the Mexican 
Tequila crash at the end of 1994 'Ind the Brazilian maxi-devaluation in January of 1999-
but even with these problems, the interest rates were less volatile through the decade 
than in the 19805. Next, the average excess returns are compared by country for the debt- , 
crisis period versus the post-debt-crisis period. A significant positive t-statistic implies a 
significantly lower mean excess return for the later period. This was not found for any of 
the countries, although Brazil did have a positive but insignificant test result. The other 
six countries in the sample demonstrated higher excess returns during the recent period, 
and most were significantly higher than during the debt crisis except for Argentina and 
Colombia (see Table 2). 
This is quite counterintuitive, and mllst be clue to fundamental changes in the 
markets and their regulation, rather than to perverse tlnancial characteristics. That is to 
say, the higher returns that accompanied lower risk in the 19905 were not clue to shifts in 
investor preferences but rather to shifts in underlying market characteristics such as bank 
regulation, currency policies and capital controls. Broadly speaking, government controls 
on the financial markets during the 1980s did not allow open market factors to determine 
rates, and by tlying to control both interest rates ancl capital flows, governments in Latin 
America ended up with lower rates than would have been justified by the high volatility 
- ancl enormous capital flight as investors found that the returns in these markets were 
not adequate. 
Hypothesis #3: More risky Latin Amm'/can coulltries will have higher realized 
,'etttrllS thall less risky coulltries during 19B2-99. 
Regressing the average return for each country for the full periocl on the standard 
deviation of that country's returns for the full period tests this hypothesis. As you can see 
in Table 3, the regression produced a coefftcient of determination (R2) of 0.11, which is 
not significant. The coefficient for the standard deviation is negative and not significant as 
well. The implication of these findings is that the relationship between risky countries 
and higher returns is not found; it appears that the opposite may be true (that is, riskier 
countries may have offered lower returns) in this period in Latin America, although the 
results are not significant. Based on the statistical test, hypothesis #3 is not supported. 
TABLE 3: 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
Hypothesis #3: More ''isky Latin American count,'ies will have higher realized 
retm'flS than less risky countries during 1982-99. 
ThL", hypothesis was tested using a simple regression of returns on risks for the 
seven Latin American countries. 
Return in Latin America 
RI" 
n' ~ 0.11 
~ (standard deviation of returns) 
-0.025 (std. dev.) 
(t ~ -0.55) 
Hypothesis #4: Investors can ,'educe overall portfolio risk, or raise ,'eturn jor a 
given risk, hy dive,'sifying into Latiu Amet'iClm b(lIlk deposit illstrulIlellis. 
This hypothesis is supported by the evidence presented in Table 4 and Figure 1 on 
the following pages. 
Hypothesis #5: Latill American bank deposit returlls de1ll01lst1'tlte a greate,' 
compollellt oj real i1lterest difjerellces with respect to tbe US "eturns, as opposed 
to deviations jr01ll purchasi1lg power parity. 
Regressing the nominal interest rate difference on the real interest rate difference 
(defined as the nominal rates minus inflation) produced the following results: 
Nominal Interest Rate Difference 
adjusted R' ~ 0.34 
number of observations: 1,339 
(t-test values in parentheses) 
0.050 
(t~11.56)·" 
+ 0.484[rea I interest ratel 
(t~26.13)'" 
***=significant at .001 level. 
Hypothesis #4: ltlVestors call reduce overall portfolio ,'isk, or ,'aise reillrtl jor a 
given risk, by dtversif.yt1lg i1ll0 Latin America1l bank deposit illstrumellts. 
Beyond the ,,,imple mean/variance aspects of Latin American investments, we may 
also expect an impact of international portfolio diversification on the required returns. 
That is, we should expect that, if the correlations between the Latin American returns and 
US returns are low or negative, then the returns required by international (dollar based) 
investors should be lower than if the correlations are positive and higher. If investors can 
reduce their overall portfolio risk by diversifying into Latin American investments, then 
they will demand a correspondingly lower return on the Latin Alnerican investments. In 
most of the literature this issue has been examined in the context of stock market 
investments, rather than bank deposits (e.g., Errunza et ai., 1999), but analogous logic 
holds here (ef. lorion, 1989). 
As shown in Table 4, the correlations between the Latin American interest rates, 
converted into dollar returns, and the eurodollar rates, are negative for all countries 
except Chile, for which the correlation between peso deposits and euroclollar deposits 
was 0.06, a velY low correlation. These findings imply that the combination of a 
eurodollar deposit with deposit(s) in a Latin American countryCies) would enable the 
investor to reduce risk. Still, the returns were frequently lower than in eurodollars, so the 
benefits from diversification were likely to be limited. 
TABLE 4: 
CORRELATIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN RETURNS WITH US RETURN 
. Country expected std. correlations 
return dev. Arg Braz Chi! Col Mex Peru Ven 
above US 
~--------------~-~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Argentina 0.06 27.3 
Brazil 4.46 16.9 -0.05 
Chile 1.87 6.0 0.00 0.13 
Colombia 2.45 4.2 0.00 0.14 0.22 
Mexico -0.22 10.1 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.06 
Peru -1.34 21.5 -0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 
Venezuela -0.53 12.9 0.10 -0.17 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 
USA 1.85 0.79 -0.21 -0.13 0.06 -0.24 -0.19 -0.26 -0.05 
By combining the euroclollar deposit with combinations of Latin American deposits, 
an optimal portfolio can be designed. Assuming that the goal is to maintain risk at rl,e 
same level as with the US bank deposit alone, Figure 1 shows that diversifying into Latin 
American bank accounts enables the investor to keep risk at the same level and raise the 
average return from 1.85 Ofo per quarter to 1.96 Ofo per quarter. Diversification takes place 
only into Argentine, Brazilian and Colombian bank deposits, which make up 13 percent 
of the optimized portfolio (using the Ibbotson software). All of the other countries arc 
dominated by these three, given the low risk of the US deposit and the superior 
risk/return characteristics of the Brazilian and Colombian deposits versus those of all 
other countries.6 This finding is consistent with previous studies that indicate that 
Colombia is the Latin American country with the lowest level of correlation with 
international markets, offering the best diversification benefits for international investors 
(Ellis et aI., 1997). 
In this situation, if the depositor/investor were willing to tolerate some more risk, 
the returns could be greatly increased, Increasing the level of acceptable risk moves the 
deposit portfolio immediately away from the us into Colombian and Brazilian deposits. 
\Vhen the portfolio moves closer to the maximum return/maximum risk end of the 
efficient frontier, Brazil dominates the other countries, while Chile, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela do not show up in any of the optimal portfolios. 
The major complication that occurs in our case is that of institutional constraints, 
Most of the Latin American countries have used capital controls and foreign exchange 
controls during the period, For example, Colombia up until 1991 disallowed domestic 
investors from investing abroad, and had controls on foreign investors' ability to buy 
dollars to remit their peso earnings from Colombia. Colombia introduced a new foreign 
investment code in JanwllY 1991 (Resolution 49), through which foreign direct and 
portfolio investments were stimulated, Most international capital flow restrictions were 
lifted and foreign exchange trading was simplified, For instance, prior to the introduction 
of the new code both foreign investors and nationals alike were required to obtain prior 
approval to undertake any foreign exchange transactions from the central bank; otherwise 
such transactions were deemed illegal. 
After 1991, however, foreign investors and domestic participants are not required to 
obtain prior approvals to undertake foreign exchange transactions and can trade among 
themselves (free market transactions) and through financial institutions (regulated and 
free markets transactions), and are only required to declare specific transactions to the 
central bank. The key transactions costs of investing in Colombia now are associated with 
the intermediation margin in the foreign exchange market and with remittance taxes. 
These features were not exclusive to Colombia. Venezuela operated a multiple 
exchange rate system in the early 1980s, and has restricted capital outAows since then 
uncleI' various policies. Mexico, Chile ancl Argentina (only since 1991) are the best 
examples of countries in our sample that would allow foreign investors to hold local 
bank accounts, earn the returns that are under discussion here, and remit the profits at 
any time, 
In sum, the portfolio mocleling effort supports the hypothesis that returns can be 
increased by diversifying into Latin American deposits, Very little diversification is justified 
if the investor want.s to maintain very low risk; but at somewhat higher levels of risk the 
returns can be greatly improved. It should also be noted that correlations between 
interest rates in Latin America and the US rate arc generally negative, implying good 
opportunity for diversification if only the returns were higher. (See Table 4 and Figure 1.) 
Retl;.ltnS;GlI,l'Eli'\rlkOe:pcISUs in Latln"l\merica 
FIGURE 1: 
OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO OF US AND LATIN AMERICAN BANK DEPOSITS, 
1982-99 
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Portfolio Statistics 
% of Portfolio Brazil 1 .96 
% of Portfolio Colombia 11.31 
% of Portfolio U.S. 86.54 
Exp Return 1.96 
Std Deviation 0.79 
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Hypothesis #5: Latill American bank deposit mturlls demonstrate a g.'eater 
component of real interest differellces with respect to the US returns, as opposed 
to deviatiolls f,'om purchasing power pm'tty, 
This hypothesis was supported by regression analysis as presented in Table 3. Since 
the real interest difference and the deviations from purchasing power parity fully 
determine the variation in nominal interest rates, only one of them can be tested in a 
statistical model. The argument that real interest differences are key to nominal interest 
differences between these Latin American countries ancl the United States is tested in the 
model here, and the results show clearly that the real interest rate differential is highly 
significant. By itself it explains 34 percent of the variation in the nominal returns in Latin 
America. 
This outcome is quite different from findings that compare US returns with those in 
Europe and Japan, where the deviations from purchasing power parity dominate, and real 
interest differentials are (ow or zero. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We cannot claim that there is a free lunch, i.e., that an investor could clearly gain 
by placing his/her investment into Latin American bank deposit.s throughout the past 19 
years. In fact, the evidence does support the idea that in several countries lower returns 
tlum those in US dollars have persisted through this period, and that diversification into 
Latin American deposits was not particularly beneficial. 
The wildly high (nominal) returns generated by the most inflationary countries 
(Argentina, Brazil and Peru) at times during the 19805 were largely nullified by currency 
devaluations that accompanied or followed these times. For that entire decade, the Latin 
American countries were poor alternatives to us dollar-denominated hank deposits hl the 
eurom<ll'ket. In the 1990s the situation became more normal, with the majority of 
countries showing higher dollar returns than in the euromarket, to go along with the 
higher risks of those investments. Even so, these excess returns were not significantly 
higher than the cUfociollar ones. It appears that most Latin American countries were and 
continue to be a poor choice for deposits by a dollar-based investor, even in the late 
19905. 
! )01 
I 
Considered in a portfolio context, it appears that only Brazil and Colombia would .U 
make <l good addition to eurodollars for bank depositors looking for a relatively low-risk 
portfolio, although even in this instance the lowest risk portfolio (not shown) contains 
only the eurodollar deposit. For investors willing to take on somewhat greater risk levels, 
the benefits from diversifying into Brazilian and Colombian cierosits were noticeably 
greater during the 1990s, 
The primary reasons for the generally unexciting returns are the enormous structural 
shifts that took place in the Latin American business systems, from continuing crisis 
during most of the 1980s to economic opening in the 1990s. These macroeconomic 
conditions were paired with extremely restrictive regulatory conditions in the 1980s, and 
then with relatively open conditions in most of the 1990s. One would expect the current 
decade to produce the "normal" positive risk/return profile for these countries) and 
likewise a positive risk premium on their deposits, given the somewhat higher risk tha t 
still exists relative to that on dollar deposits. 
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ENDNOTES 
I This ex post formulation raises a key point. If returns were also similar to this ex ante, 
then investors would have been expected to take their investable funds elsewhere. This is 
precisely what happened in the case of foreign bank lenders, that decreased their loans 
to Latin America dramatically during the decade. This was also truE for domestic 
investors, with the enormous capital flight that occurred throughout Latin America during 
the 1980s. Thlls it appears that ex ante returns were also generally lower in Latin America 
during the 1.9805, and despite government policies to restrict capital outflows, investors 
did take their funds out of these countries in search of better returns elsewhere, mainly in 
the US. 
2111 a domestic context, one could argue that the distribution of bank deposit returns is 
always positive, ignoring uninsured bankruptcy risk. In the international context, with 
exchange rate changes, bank deposit returns measured in dollars may be positive or 
neg~ltive, so the returns are distributed more like stock market returns than domestic 
bank deposits. 
3 We used line 60L in International Financial Statistics (IMF: Washington, D.C.: CD-ROM, 
2000) for each of the countries. This interest rate is generally defined as the interbank 
deposit rate on 3-111onth deposits, but it varies to some extent across countries. For the 
United States, we used the 3-month eura-dollar deposit interest rate, line 60LOD, 
assuming that the investor was comparing returns from foreign deposits. 
, Bekaert and Harvey (1999) provide a detailed analysis of official liberalization dates for 
latin American countries. 
5 The deposit interest rate on interbank deposits in pesos in Argentina was 9,722 % on 
an annualized basis in January of 1990. 
6 Although not shown in the paper, higher returns are possible by diversifying further 
into Brazilian and Colombian deposits. At the lower end of the efficient frontier, most of 
the investment goes into Colombian deposits. The US deposit is excluded once the risk 
level (standard deviation) rises about 4% per month, and the Brazilian deposit dominates 
all others at the highest return point on the efficient frontier, with a risk of about 17%) per 
month. 
